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Abstract. This paper refines the game theoretic analysis of conversa-
tions in [5] by adding epistemic concepts to make explicit the intuitive
idea that conversationalists typically conceive of conversational strate-
gies in a situation of imperfect information. This “epistemic” turn has
important ramifications for linguistic analysis, and we illustrate our ap-
proach with a detailed treatment of linguistic examples.
1 Introduction
It has long been a common sense intuition of many philosophical and linguistic
theories of communication that a conversational contribution should be inter-
preted in light of the participants’ own beliefs and plans, in particular their
beliefs about beliefs and plans of the other participants and so on. However,
most formal theories of semantics and pragmatics do not rigorously implement
this conception. Game theoretic analyses, in particular epistemic game theory
and is notion of a type, provide the tools to do this and a new perspective on the
notion of context and its role in the interpretation of ambiguous linguistic sig-
nals, as we show here. While some work has investigated the notion of meaning
using games in cooperative settings [11], only the approach of [5] applies a game-
theoretic approach to entire conversations. Moreover, this approach, which we
build on here, does not require assumptions of cooperativity on which conversa-
tionalists have convergent interests. In this paper, we show how adding epistemic
concepts to the approach in [5] yield compelling interpretations of dialogues.
Our paper also has a technical aim. [5] introduced a new framework for
analyzing conversations in strategic settings, Message Exchange (ME) games.
We fill here what we see as an important lacuna in that and subsequent work [4,
6, 7]. To date, although ME games have been analyzed in the setting of imperfect
information, the information structure at work in the dynamics of the game has
not been elucidated. We provide an analysis of ME games under assumptions
of imperfect information, incorporating the beliefs of the players about their
opponents and about a key component of ME games, the Jury, which is an
abstract scoring device that assigns winning conditions to the players.
Our paper begins with a motivating example for adding epistemic concepts
(Section 2), and then proceeds to provide some technical preliminaries in Section
3. We then go on to introduce the notions of types and belief functions and the
tools required to develop them in our setting in Section 4. We have put more
technical details fleshing out Sections 3 and 4 in the Appendix. We treat some
linguistic examples in detail to show how the machinery works, and we then
draw some conclusions for linguistic interpretation, its treatment of ambiguity, its
subjectivity, and some sources for the biases inherent in that subjectivity. Section
5 offers some further thoughts on the subjectivity of information and conclude by
mentioning some questions for future research that our new framework suggests.
2 Why add epistemic concepts to ME games?
ME games are infinitary games with two players, each playing a finite sequence of
discourse moves, in alternating fashion. As the players make moves, the semantics
of these moves entails certain public commitments on their part. The players
need not have any interests or goals in common. Nevertheless, they conduct the
conversation and pay attention to each others’ public commitments in the hope
of persuading the Jury to award them a win in the conversation.
As a motivating example, consider the following excerpt from a courtroom
proceedings where a prosecutor is querying the defendant (originally from [16]
and later discussed in [3, 5]).
Example 1 Bronston and the Prosecutor:
a. Prosecutor: Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr. Bronston?
b. Bronston: No, sir.
c. Prosecutor: Have you ever?
d. Bronston: The company had an account there for about six months, in Zurich.
e. Prosecutor: Thank you Mr. Bronston.
For convenience, let us denote Prosecutor and Bronston with the letters P and B
respectively. One conversational goal of the P in Example 1 is to get B to com-
mit to an answer eventually (and admit to an incriminating fact) or to continue
to refuse to answer (in which case he will be charged with contempt of court).
While the conversation here is of course finite, we cannot say that P wins if
B does not answer immediately. That would disallow questions of clarification,
vague or imprecise responses that demand clarification and so on, as [5] argue.
Nor is it plausible, given that we are interested in analyzing actual conversa-
tional practice, to fix in advance the number of such clarification questions or
follow up questions and their responses in advance. Thus, the goals of P must be
stated in such a way that they are naturally analyzed as conditions on infinitary
plays, which are strings of discourse moves. Using the adverb eventually in our
description shows that a natural way to think of P’s winning condition is in
terms of a formula of linear temporal logic or, equivalently, a first order formula
over the language of infinite strings.
While we follow this analysis, which improves considerably upon [3], the
account in [5] is still incomplete. In particular, the analysis of the epistemic
situation in Example 1 is only partial in [3] and non-existent in [5]. The epistemic
situation of Bronston, the Prosecutor and the Jury are key to an analysis of this
example. To understand the strategies of B and P in Example 1, it is natural to
suppose that B has one belief about the Jury, P has another. For instance, why
is P satisfied with B’s answer? Presumably, in asking the question, P’s goal was
that B answer, or go on record as refusing to answer, the question. But B did
not commit to having a bank account, or to not having a bank account, but he
also did not refuse to answer the question and implicated a negative answer to
the question. Why did P not follow up with a response like:
e’. I’m not interested in what your company did, Mr. Bronston. I want to know whether you ever
had a bank account at that institution.
But now suppose that P believes of the Jury that having the implicated answer
is sufficient; this counts as B committing to not having had a bank account.
This would explain the lack of the continuation (e’.); P does not respond with
(e’.), because he believes he has already attained his objective for this part of
the conversation. In fact the Bronston trial concluded in P’s favor in the lower
court, and so his beliefs about the Jury were justified.
Now what about B? B could have simply been inattentive, but another epis-
temic assumption naturally explains his behavior of producing an indirect an-
swer to P’s question: B thought that the Jury might have a different standard
for commitments than P did. If B assumed that the Jury is of the type according
to which he could only be convicted on the basis of firm or hard, not implicated,
commitments about his involvement with the Swiss bank, then an implicated
response would be rational. If we suppose further that B believes that P might
assign the Jury a type of the sort P actually seems to have, then B’s response
is optimal. First, the indirect response avoids making hard commitments that
incriminate him according to his conception of the Jury, and secondly, the re-
sponse satisfies P and so P does not probe further, in particular with potentially
damaging continuations like (e’). In fact B’s beliefs about the Jury, though they
were not accurate for the lower court, were right concerning the Jury of the
Supreme court, to which B and his lawyers appealed (and won) [16].
Example 1 will guide our analysis in this paper, although there are many
other applications of epistemic concepts in ME games outside a courtroom set-
ting where one, some of which are to be found in [5]. Epistemic concepts have
a role to play in explaining the use of discourse moves and in terms of strategies
for achieving an agent’s conversational goals in any conversation where partici-
pants’ interests are not completely aligned. Epistemic concepts are also crucial
for technical reasons in ME games where players’ interests are opposed but it is
common knowledge that the conversation cannot really go on forever. We will
formalize beliefs players have about other players and about the Jury using types
in the manner of [12], as is standard in epistemic game theory [9, 14]. The types
and beliefs that interest us here are beliefs about linguistic moves and propensi-
ties of agents to use certain linguistic moves and strategies. We then apply our
formalism to standard ME games, and to discounted ME games [5, 4].
3 Preliminaries
In this section we develop the necessary background for the formal model to be
presented in the following sections, re-visiting some of the definitions for ME
games introduced in [5]. We then go on to introduce the notions of types and
belief functions and the tools required to develop them in our setting. We will
work in a setting where there are two players (conversationalists), 0 and 1, to
simplify the notation and examples. The definitions and results easily generalize
to settings with more than two players. In what follows i will always take a value
in {0, 1} unless mentioned otherwise. Player (1− i) will denote the opponent of
Player i.
[5] defines ME game as infinite games over a countable ‘vocabulary’ V . The
intuitive idea behind an ME game is that a conversation proceeds in turns where
in each turn one of the players ‘speaks’ or plays a string of elements from V . In
addition, in the case of conversations, it is essential to keep track of “who says
what”. To model this, each player i was assigned a copy Vi of the vocabulary V
which is simply given as Vi = V ×{i}. Thus when Player i plays u ∈ V (say), it is
noted as (u, i). The formal vocabulary for our ME games is thus the set (V0∪V1).
The conversations will thus correspond to plays of ME games which are the union
of finite or infinite sequences in (V0 ∪ V1), denoted as (V0 ∪ V1)
∗ and (V0 ∪ V1)
ω
respectively. The set of all possible conversations is thus ((V0∪V1)
∗∪ (V0∪V1)
ω)
and is denoted as (V0 ∪ V1)
∞. As usual, we let (V0 ∪ V1)
+ = (V0 ∪ V1)
∗ \ {ǫ}
where ǫ is the empty sequence.
Given any set A, we let ∆(A) be the set of all probability measures on
A. Now, because our conversational agents will be have beliefs with a certain
probability about what other agents may say in a given situation, we will need
to endow the set of all possible conversations (plays), with a measure. In the
Appendix, we show how to endow the set of finite and infinite strings over any
generic non-empty set X with a topology. So, when we consider plays in our ME
games, which will be sequences over (V0 ∪ V1), we shall assume that they have
the topology defined for X.
3.1 The vocabulary
We now formally define the vocabulary V of an ME game. Players do not play
just any sequence of arbitrary strings but sentences or sets of sentences that
‘make sense’. To ensure this, the vocabulary V should have an exogenous seman-
tics built-in. In order to achieve this, we exploit a semantic theory for discourse,
SDRT [2]. SDRT develops a rich language to characterize the semantics and
pragmatics of moves in dialogue. This means that we can exploit the notion of
entailment associated with the language of SDRSs to track commitments of each
player in an ME game. In particular, the language of SDRT features variables
for dialogue moves that are characterized by contents that the move commits its
speaker to. Crucially, some of this content involves predicates that denote rhetor-
ical relations between moves—like the relation of question answer pair (qap), in
which one move answers a prior move characterized by a question. The vocabu-
lary V of an ME game thus contains a countable distinguished set of individual
constants or discourse constituent labels DU = {π, π1, π2, . . .}, and a finite set
of discourse relation symbols R = {R,R1, . . .Rn}, and formulas φ, φ1, ... from
some fixed language L for describing elementary discourse move contents, a lan-
guage like that of higher order logic used in, e.g., in Montague Grammar. V
consists of SDRT formulas of the form 〈π : φ〉, where φ is either a formula of L,
a relational formula of the form R(π1, π2), which says that π1 stands in relation
R to π2 (one such relation R is qap), or a conjunction of SDRT formulas and
relational formulas. When φ is a formula of L, then the DU π such that π : φ is
called an elementary discourse unit or EDU; when φ is a conjunction of SDRT
formulas and relational formulas, we say that π : φ is a complex discourse unit
or CDU. Each discourse relation symbolized in V comes with constraints as to
when it can be coherently used in context and when it cannot. Also note that
since L is the language of some higher order logic, it can existentially quantify
over the relation symbols in R.
We can define an equivalence relation ∼ on V based on what coherent and
consistent continuations they allow. φ1 ∼ φ2, if for any SDRT formula ψ, φ1.ψ
is a consistent and coherent continuation just in case φ2.ψ is, where coherence
and consistency are defined as in [6]. If φ1 ∼ φ2 then φ1 and φ2 are semantically
equivalent, though the reverse is not true; φ1 and φ2 may have the same truth
conditional content but give rise to different continuations in virtue, for example,
of their politeness register. We shall refer to a ∼ equivalence class of V as a class
of discourse moves. In the examples that follow, when we talk of a ‘move’, we
shall actually be referring to its class.
3.2 ME game
We now define an ME game. In the definition we use a term J which stands for
a ‘Jury’ of the ME game. It is the Jury who determines which player (or players)
has achieved her goal in the conversation, or in other words, fixes the winning
conditions for the players. We shall formally define the Jury in the following
subsection.
Definition 1 (ME game [5]). A Message Exchange game (ME game), G, is a
tuple ((V0 ∪ V1)
∞,J ) where J is a Jury.
The ME game proceeds in turns where, by convention, Player 0 starts the
game by playing x1, Player 1 follows with x2, Player 0 then plays x3 and so on.
This results in the sequence x1x2x3 . . .. Given our vocabulary V this sequence is a
concatenation of formulas from L where concatenation is viewed as conjunction.
As an example consider the following conversation between players 0 and 1.
Example 2 Player 0 plays the sequence x1 followed by Player 1 who plays the
sequence x2 where
a. x1 = (Why did you come back?, 0)
b. x2 = (The meeting has been cancelled. N did not turn up., 1)
This results in the sequence x1x2 and so on. To cast this in terms of the language
L, let φ1, φ2 and φ3 be the EDUs:
– φ1 = Why did you come back?
– φ2 = The meeting has been cancelled.
– φ3 = N did not turn up.
φ1 and φ2 bear a clear semantic relation to each other—namely, that φ2 is an
answer to φ1, written as qap(π1, π2) in the language L. Such obvious semantic
relations are part of the discourse grammar of the language and common knowl-
edge of the participants. Work on discourse parsing as in [1] makes precise a
notion of discourse grammar to which we will appeal here: the grammar is some-
thing that is learned and assigns a probability distribution to connections between
discourse units and the relations that label those connections. On the other hand,
the relation between π3 and the previous EDUs is less clear; the grammar tells
us that π3 is connected to π2 with high probability, but the grammar does not
assign a high probability to just one relation holding between them. We could
interpret the relation as π3’s furnishing an explanation of the event described in
π2—something we denote in L by expl(π2, π3). Or we could interpret the relation
as π3’s providing a result or causal effect of the event described in π2 (denoted in
L by res(π2, π3)). But because these relations have incompatible semantic conse-
quences, both cannot apply to π2 and π3. In such a case, we say that the relation
between π2 and π3 is underspecified and we simply quantify over a relational
variable to signify this. In the language of L the sequence x1x2 thus is:
x1x2 ≡ (〈π1 : φ1〉, 0)(〈〈π2 : φ2〉qap(π1π2)〈π3 : φ3〉∃R · R(π2, π3)〉, 1)
x1x2 is what [2] calls an underspecified logical form or ulf. The relation be-
tween π2 and π3 is underspecified, because the grammar (syntax, compositional
and lexical semantics) does not determine it.
This leads us to the definition of a play of an ME game.
Definition 2 (Play). A play ρ of an ME game is a sequence in (V0 ∪ V1).
ρ can be a ulf. Once the existentially quantified relation variables are in-
stantiated with specific relation names, we get what [2] calls a fully specified
logical form or flf. Thus, a single ulf can give rise to a (finite) number of flfs
or SDRSs, as, in the language of SDRT, an flf is nothing but a complete SDRS.
We define each such SDRS to be a history.
Definition 3 (History). A history h of an ME game is an flf or equivalently
an SDRS.
Given a play ρ, h(ρ) denotes the set of all histories generated by instantiating
the existentially quantified relation variables in ρ with witnesses from the set of
actual relation terms. Let |ρ| denote the number of turns in a play ρ and |h|
denote the same for the history h. By definition, |ρ| = |h| for all h ∈ h(ρ). We
let P (resp. H) denote the set of all plays (resp. histories), where ǫ ∈ P (resp.
ǫ ∈ H) is the empty play (resp. empty history). We say that a play (resp. history)
of the form (V0 ∪ V1)
+V +i is an i-play (resp. i-history). We denote the set of i-
plays (resp. i-histories) by Pi (resp. Hi). Thus P = P0 ∪ P1 and H = H0 ∪ H1.
Moreover, given a play ρ (resp. a history h) we let ρj , 0 ≤ j ≤ |ρ| (resp. hj)
denote the length-j prefix of ρ (resp. h). That is, it is the play/history after j
turns. Finally, given a play ρ of an ME game it will be convenient to define the
constituent of ρ, cons(ρ), which is the sequence of DUs that occur in ρ in the
same order.
Example 3 Continuing with our Example 2, the play after two turns is ρ =
x1x2. The existential relation R in ρ can be interpreted in at least three different
ways. This results in the following three histories (SDRSs/flfs) [we supress the
turn indices for better readability].
a. 〈π1 : φ1〉〈π2 : φ2〉〈π3 : φ3〉expl(π2, π3)
b. 〈π1 : φ1〉〈π2 : φ2〉〈π3 : φ3〉res(π2, π3)
c. 〈π1 : φ1〉〈π2 : φ2〉〈π3 : φ3〉
Where the third interpretation is where the R is interpreted as the vacuous
relation. We shall represent a play which is an ulf as shaded regions in the ME
game tree as can be seen in Figure 1 which is the game tree for the example 2.
π1
π2
expl
−→ π3 π2
res
−→ π3 π2;π3• •
• • •
qap qap qap
Fig. 1: The ME game tree for the conversation in Example 2
3.3 The Jury
We now formally define the concept of a Jury. The Jury of an ME game is
an entity that ‘evaluates’ an instance of the game (a play which is the actual
strategic conversation) and decides the winner after a ‘finite number of turns’
based on whether or not a player has, according to it, achieved her goal. For a
finite sequence x ∈ (V0 ∪ V1)
∗, let O(x) denote the set of all (finite and infinite)
continuations of x. That is, O(x) = {xy | y ∈ (V0 ∪ V1)
∞}. In topological terms
O(x) is the ‘basic open set’ corresponding to x [for more on the topological
aspects of sequences of conversations, see [5]]. We can then define
Definition 4 (Jury). The Jury of an ME game is a tuple J = (Win0,Win1)
where Wini ⊂ (V0 ∪ V1)
∞ for each i and satisfies the following conditions:
– Finite checkability: for every finite sequence x ∈ (V0 ∪ V1)
∗, x ∈ Wini if
and only if O(x) ⊂Wini.
– Consistency: for every play ρ of the ME game, ρ ∈Wini iff h(ρ) ⊂Wini.
Wini is called the Jury winning condition or simply the winning condition for
Player i.
The idea behind the restriction of finite checkability is that if after a certain
finite sequence of exchange x, x ∈ Wini for some i then the Jury can already
declare i as the winner of the conversation because it is assured that every
continuation of x will be winning for i. If that is not the case, the Jury is still
uncertain about the winner and has to let the conversation evolve further.
Definition 5 (Winning plays/histories). A play ρ (resp. a history h) is said
to be winning for Player i if ρ ∈Wini (resp. h ∈Wini).
1
Note that it might be that (Win0 ∩Win1) 6= ∅, in which case x ∈ (Win0 ∩
Win1) is winning for both players.
[5] argues that it is essential in strategic situations that players reason about
conversations as if they were infinite, and models this via infinite games. How-
ever, all conversations are in fact finite; at some point the Jury just stops listen-
ing. To address this issue, [4] introduces a weighting function for the Jury that
guarantees a winner in a finite number of moves. In order to preserve the strate-
gic reasoning of players in infinitary situations, it is crucial that such weighting
functions (or in this case the Jury winning conditions) not be known to the
players. Here we satisfy this requirement by making the beliefs of the players
about the Jury uncertain, in particular, the Jury winning conditions. However,
we abstract out here the weighting function in the definition of the Jury winning
condition itself (Definition 4) in the interests of simplicity.
Definition 6 (Utility). In what follows, for every history h of an ME game,
it will be convenient to assign a binary utility ui(h) for each player i defined as:
ui(h) =
{
1 if h ∈Wini
0 otherwise
Definition 7 (Pure strategy). A pure strategy σi for Player i in an ME game
is a function from the set of (1− i)-plays to moves in V +i . That is, σi : P(1−i) →
V +i . Let Si denote the set of strategies for Player i and let S = S0 × S1.
1 It is known that sigma algebras are not sufficient to reason about the information of
the players while strategising and can lead to paradoxical results [10]. Such paradoxes
are avoided in our setting because it is the Jury who determines the winning sets
Win0,Win1 of the players and these sets are not subject to measurability restrictions.
Let ρ = x0x1 . . . be a play in an ME game where x0 = ǫ and let ρj =
x0x1 . . . xj for j > 0 be the set of prefixes of ρ. We say that ρ conforms to a
strategy σi of Player i if for every (1− i)-play ρj , xj+1 = σi(ρj). Let ρσi denote
the set of plays that conform to the strategy σi and let ρ(σ0,σ1) denote the unique
play that conforms to the the strategy pair (σ0, σ1). Conversely, given a finite
play ρ, we let Sρi denote the set of all strategies of Player i such that ρ conforms
to every strategy σi ∈ S
ρ
i and let S
ρ denote the set of all strategy pairs such
that ρ conforms to every (σ0, σ1) ∈ S
ρ.
To define a measure over Si, note that Si is a subset of (V
+
i )
P(1−i) where
(V +i )
P(1−i) is the set of all functions from P(1−i) to V
+
i . However, Aumann in
[8] showed that even when both P(1−i) are V
+
i separable, not all subsets of
(V +i )
P(1−i) are measurable. Hence, from now on we shall only deal with measur-
able subsets of Si and S. Moreover, when we say Si or S we mean the largest
measurable subsets of Si and S respectively.
Example 4 Let us now see how we can cast the court-room situation of Example
1 into an ME game. Let us label the conversation in terms of their DUs:
a. P: 〈π1 : φ1 =Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss Banks, Mr. Bronston?〉
c. P: 〈π2 : φ2 =Have you ever?〉
e. P: 〈π3 : φ3 =Thank you Mr. Bronston.〉
e’. P: 〈π′3 : φ
′
3 =Please do not try to mislead the Jury. Answer my question directly. I don’t
want to know if the company had an account at the Swiss banks. I want to know if you had
an account there.〉
b. B: 〈π4 : φ4 =No, sir.〉
b’. B: 〈π′4 : φ
′
4 =Yes, sir.〉
b. B: 〈π5 : φ5 =The company had an account there for about six months, in Zurich.〉
We then formulate the ME game structure for the example together with
continuations among the types we have mentioned as shown in Figure 2.
The dashed edges represent “all possible continuations”. Note that after each
history there might be infinitely many other moves by either player. However,
these moves are irrelevant to the topic of the trial. Hence they are not depicted
in our simplified picture. The labels on the edges represent the discourse relations
between the DUs that are given by SDRT; for example Q-elab denotes a relation
between an original question and a follow-up question, while IQAP denotes a
relation between a question q and a DU whose implicatures provide an answer to
q. Similar to Example 2, the shaded region represents the resulting 5-turn play ρ5
of Example 1 which is a ulf determined by the grammar. The ulf is a formula
with a variable for the relation inferred between π2 and π5:
ρ5 =(〈π1 : φ1〉〈π4 : φ4qap(π1, π4)〉〈π2 : φ2qelab(π1, π2)〉〈π5 : φ5∃R · R(π2, π5)〉
〈π3 : φ3ack(π5, π3)〉)
The relation between π2 and π5 is underspecified, because the grammar (syn-
tax, compositional and lexical semantics) does not determine it. Each of the
π1 : φ1 π4 : φ4
π′4 : φ
′
4 π3 : φ3
π2 : φ2
π′4 : φ
′
4 π3 : φ3
π3 : φ3π4 : φ4
π5 : φ5 π5 : φ5
π3 : φ3π3 : φ3 π′3 : φ
′
3
qap
qap
ack
q-elab
iqap
qap
qap ack
ack
cmmnt
ack ack corr
q-elab
Fig. 2: The ME game tree for the conversation in Example 1
branches in the shaded region provides a different witness for R resulting in an
SDRS (flf). Each such SDRS is a history in the game. We consider only two
such histories (SDRSs), hcmt, hiqap, in the present example to keep the presenta-
tion simple and uncluttered. These are the histories where R is interpreted as a
‘comment’ and an ‘indirect question-answer pair’ respectively. That is,
hcmt = 〈π1 : φ1〉〈π4 : φ4qap(π1, π4)〉〈π2 : φ2qelab(π1, π2)〉〈π5 : φ5cmt(π2, π5)〉〈π3 : φ3ack(π5, π3)〉
hiqap = 〈π1 : φ1〉〈π4 : φ4qap(π1, π4)〉〈π2 : φ2qelab(π1, π2)〉〈π5 : φ5iqap(π2, π5)〉〈π3 : φ3ack(π5, π3)〉
Many other histories could result from the ulf. For instance, R may also be
interpreted as a ‘background’, a ‘correction’ etc. These witnesses are the result
of uncertain inference that depends on several factors.2
Now, a history of the form
hy ∈
{
〈π1 : φ1〉〈π
′
4 : φ
′
4qap(π1, π
′
4)〉 . . .
〈π′1 : φ1〉〈π4 : φ4qap(π1, π4)〉〈π2 : φ2qelab(π1, π2)〉〈π
′
4 : φ
′
4qap(π2, π
′
4)〉 . . .
2 [2] modelled the inference with a non-monotonic logic, with which we could infer the
disjunction of the relations we have depicted above. But it could not do more than
that. We assume here a more probabilistic inference relation to model implicatures,
and below we will show how these probabilities are dependent on beliefs about
interlocutors.
represents a sequence where B has responded to P’s question with a Yes. These are
direct answers, and given our assumptions in the introduction about P’s winning
conditions encoded by the Jury, such histories are losing for B. Also, as no
continuation of such a history is relevant to the outcome of the trial, such plays
are finitely decided. Similarly, a history where B has responded to P’s question
with a No is also losing for B given our assumptions and are finitely decided.
The most interesting histories are hcmt and hiqap which are the ones generated
from the play which actually transpired in the court-room scene. Whether the
Jury interprets ρ5 as hcmt or as hiqap and whether such a history is winning for
B or not depends on the nature of the Jury, or its ‘type’. We look at two cases:
Case(i): the case where the Jury interprets ρ5 as hiqap and puts hiqap ∈ WinP . Note,
that this is the case where the Jury interprets the move π5 by B as having
the implicature:
(I) The company had an account in the Swiss banks but Bronston himself did
not.
Case(ii): the case where the Jury interprets ρ5 as hcmt and puts hcmt ∈ WinB for the
lack of a follow-up from P.
As conversation is supposedly a rational activity, we should try to determine
whether B is rational in playing π5∃R.R(π2, π5) after π2? What about P? Is he
rational when he plays π3ack(π5, π3) after π5? Intuition says that in case (i) P
was rational and so was B, whereas in (ii) P was not playing optimally. And we
shall see that the Jury, or the players’ estimates of the Jury, plays a crucial role
in deciding rational play.
To flesh this out, we turn to the epistemic structure of the above ME game.
4 The dynamics of ME games
In this section we describe the dynamics of ME games. We study ME games
from the perspectives of the players, the Jury, and a third party observer (us).
What do the players think and believe as they make their moves? Of course,
every player wants to ‘win’, to achieve what he believes is the winning goal set
for him by the Jury. Based on this belief and also what he believes of the other
players’ approach, he strategizes for every next move.
4.1 Types, beliefs and interpretations
The type of a player i is an abstract object that is supposed to code-up anything
and everything about the player, including his behaviour, the way he strategizes,
his personal biases, etc. [12].
Definition 8 (Harsanyi type space [12]). A Harsanyi type space for S is
a tuple T = ({Ti}i∈{0,1}, TJ , {βˆ
ρ
i }i∈{0,1},ρ∈P , {βˆ
ρ
J }ρ∈P , S) such that TJ and Ti,
for each i, are non-empty (at-most countable) sets called the Jury-types and i-
types respectively and {βˆρi } and {βˆ
ρ
J } are the beliefs of Player i and the Jury
respectively at play ρ ∈ P and are defined below.
We are interested in the beliefs of the players about other players and about
what they have said and how these two things influence each other. So we will
separate out the effect of types both on beliefs about other players and on in-
terpretations of a conversation that result in particular histories.
Definition 9 (Belief function). For every play ρ ∈ P the (first order) belief
βˆρi of player i at ρ is a pair of measurable functions βˆ
ρ
i = (β
ρ
i , ξ
ρ
i ) where β
ρ
i is
the belief function and ξρi is the interpretation function defined as:
βρi : Ti × h(ρ)→ ∆(T(1−i) × S
ρ
(1−i) × TJ )
ξρi : Ti × T(1−i) × TJ → ∆(h(ρ))
Similarly the (first order) belief βˆρJ of the Jury is a pair of measurable func-
tions βˆρJ = (β
ρ
J , ξ
ρ
J ) where the belief function β
ρ
i and the interpretation function
ξρi are defined as:
βρJ : TJ × h(ρ)→ ∆(T0 × S
ρ
0 × T1 × S
ρ
1 )
ξρJ : TJ × T0 × T1 → ∆(h(ρ))
Note that Ti and TJ are equipped with the discrete topology and (T(1−i) ×
Sρ(1−i) × TJ ) the product topology as usual and receives the product measure.
Hence the belief functions can also be written as:
βρi : Ti × h(ρ)→ ∆(T(1−i))×∆(S
ρ
(1−i))×∆(TJ )
βρJ : TJ × h(ρ)→ ∆(T0)×∆(S
ρ
0 )×∆(T1)×∆(S
ρ
1 )
Intuitively, for any type of the player or the Jury, the respective interpretation
function says how they interpret the current play as; that is, what are the prob-
abilities that they assign to each possible history arising from the current play.
The belief function then gives their beliefs about the types and the strategies of
the other players and/or the Jury for this interpretation. That the interpretation
function returns a probability distribution over histories is consonant with the
way computational linguists like [1] model how various features of the play lead
to a probability distribution over full SDRSs, something we mentioned in the
previous section.
For certain examples, the beliefs or the interpretations of the players or the
Jury may be independent of one or more components.3 In that case we shall
simply suppress those components. For example, the winning condition for the
players might depend entirely on the Jury’s belief about the type of just one of
the players, Player i (say) and be independent of what it believes about the type
of Player (1 − i) or the strategies of the players. In that case the belief of the
Jury is given by the function βρJ : TJ × h(ρ) → ∆(Ti) Such independence will
often simplify our analyses of some examples below.
3 A function f : A1×A2× . . . An → B is independent of the jth component, 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
if for all aj , a
′
j ∈ Aj , f(a1, a2, . . . , aj , . . . , an) = f(a1, a2, . . . , a
′
j , . . . , an).
We will also often deal with these functions when one or more of the compo-
nents are fixed. For example, suppose we want to talk about the interpretation of
a type of the Jury given that the types of the players are t0 and t1 respectively.
Then, we talk about the interpretation function of the Jury restricted to types
t0 and t1 and is given as ξ
ρ
J |(t0×t1) : TJ ×{t0}×{t1} → ∆(h(ρ)) When the inde-
pendent component(s) are clear from the context, we shall often supress them in
the description of the functions. The above function would then be given simply
as: ξρJ : TJ → ∆(h(ρ))
S, the set of strategies over linguistic moves in ME games, is an uncountable
set. Thus, the measures provided by belief functions are probability density
functions over subsets in (T(1−i) × S(1−i) × TJ ), something we exploit to define
higher order beliefs, beliefs that players or the Jury have about the beliefs of
other players (and the Jury) (for details see the Appendix).
4.2 The Bronston example revisited
Example 5 In light of these epistemic notions for ME games, let us revisit
our example of Bronston and the Prosecutor. A strategy is said to be consistent
(coherent) if all plays conforming to it are linguistically consistent (coherent) [see
[6] for a formal definition of coherence and consistency]. After his elaboration
question π2, we can classify the coherent and consistent strategies of P into two
categories and those of B into three. We formulate these strategies in terms of
of the classes of moves as discussed at the end of Section 3.1.
– Strategies where P plays π3ack(πα, π3), πα ∈ {π4, π
′
4, π5} on his turn after B
plays any move of the form (class) π4, π
′
4, or π5. Crucially on this strategy
P acknowledges B’s indirect answer. We denote such a kind of strategy as
σack.
– Strategies where P plays π′3qelab(π4, π
′
3), that is, asks a follow-up question
on some turn after B has played π4 and plays π2ack(π, π2), π ∈ {π4, π
′
4} in
response to π4 and π
′
4. We denote such a strategy as σqelab.
Here is the specification of B’s strategies:
– Strategies where he eventually admits a yes. Such a strategy will be denoted
as τyes.
– Strategies where he eventually admits a no. Such a strategy will be denoted
as τno.
– Finally, strategies where he sticks to something of the form π5. Such a strat-
egy will be denoted as τind.
Thus, after the question π2 by P, we can partition B’s strategies of interest
into three sets, and we can consider SB = {τyes, τno, τind}. Similarly, after B’s
moves, P has effectively two strategies SP = {σack, σqelab}. Thus, we can just
consider S for our example as a finite set: S = SP × SB. Let us suppose that
P and B each have two types: TP = {tP , t
′
P }, and TB = {tB , t
′
B}. We will also
not consider types of the Jury in this example; so TJ = ∅. Let ρ3 be the play:
ρ3 = π1π4qap(π1, π4)π2qelab(π4, π2). ρ3 in itself is a complete SDRS and hence
h(ρ3) contains only one history h (say). Thus, the interpretation functions ξ
ρ3
B
and ξρ3P for B and P both trivially map ρ3 to h irrespective of their types. That
is, all the types of both the players are sure about the history being h.
Now suppose, after the play ρ3, the (first-order) belief maps for each of these
types are described by the tables 1a and 1b.
βρ3P (tP , h) τyes τno τind
tB 0.5 0.3 0
t′B 0 0 0.2
βρ3P (t
′
P , h) τyes τno τind
tB 0.3 0.2 0
t′B 0 0 0.5
Table 1a: P’s beliefs about B after the play ρ3
Table 1a says that after ρ3, type tP of P believes that B is of type tB and plays
a strategy of the form τyes with probability 0.5, of the form τno with probability
0.3 and of the form τind with probability 0. tP also believes that B is of type
t′B and plays a strategy of the form τyes with probability 0, of the form τno with
probability 0 and of the form τind with probability 0.2. Note that the individual
probabilities sum to 1 as should be the case. Table 1a also says that after ρ3,
type t′P of P believes that B is of type tB and plays a strategy of the form τyes
with probability 0.3, of the form τno with probability 0.2 and of the form τind with
probability 0. t′P also believes that B is of type t
′
B and plays a strategy of the
form τyes with probability 0, of the form τno with probability 0 and of the form
τind with probability 0.5. Table 1b is similar.
We can now calculate the first and higher order beliefs of P and B. Both P
and B have two types. If B is of the type tB then he he assigns an equal probability
to P being of type tP and t
′
P and equal probabilities to P’s playing a strategy of
the form σack or σqelab. On the other hand if he is of type t
′
B, although he assigns
both of tP and t
′
P equal probability, he is certain that P plays a strategy of the
form σqelab in both cases. Next, type tP of P assigns a probability of 0.8 to the
type tB and a probability of 0.2 to the type t
′
B of B respectively (as can be seen by
summing the rows for each type in Table 1a). Thus type tP of P believes that it
is likely with probability 0.8 that (i) B thinks there is a 50% chance that he plays
a strategy of the form σack and likely with the remaining probability 0.2 that (ii)
B thinks for certain that he plays a strategy of the form σqelab. And similarly for
type t′P of P. These are second-order beliefs of P. We can continue this way for
the higher order beliefs of P and B.
Now, B plays π5∃R · R(π2, π5) and the play ρ3 is extended to ρ4 as:
ρ4 = π1π4qap(π1, π4)π2qelab(π4, π2)π5∃R · R(π2, π5)
As we saw in Eg. 4, there are (at-least) two relevant histories (SDRSs) in
the set h(ρ4). These are depicted in the shaded region of Figure 2 and are given
as follows:
βρ3B (tB , h) σack σqelab
tP 0.5 0
t′P 0 0.5
βρ3B (t
′
B , h) σack σqelab
tP 0 0.5
t′P 0 0.5
Table 1b: B’s beliefs about P after the play ρ3
hcmt = π1π4qap(π1, π4)π2qelab(π4, π2)π5cmt(π2, π5)
hiqap = π1π4qap(π1, π4)π2qelab(π4, π2)π5iqap(π2, π5)
B and P interpret ρ4 in different ways. In ρ4 tP and t
′
P are confronted
with an indirect response. This will affect their interpretations. tP might be
more likely to take this indirect response as an IQAP and so ξρ4P (tP )(hiqap) =
0.7, ξρ4P (tP )(hcmt) = 0.3. while the interpretations of t
′
P , who was more attuned
to the possibility of an indirect response and might be more suspicious, after the
play ρ4 are: ξ
ρ4
P (t
′
P )(hcmt) = ξ
ρ4
P (t
′
P )(hiqap) = 0.5.
Furthermore, suppose irrespective of his type B did intend the move as an in-
direct response to P’s question. In that case, the the interpretation function of tB
and t′B after the play ρ4 can be given as: ξ
ρ4
B (tB)(hcmt) = 0 and ξ
ρ4
B (t
′
B)(hiqap) =
1.
In general, the two histories may affect B and P’s beliefs about the type-
strategy pairs of the other player – hcmt and hiqap may keep the probabilities
unchanged for tP while they may change the probability distribution for t
′
P over
B’s strategies; he might assign τind a higher probability for t
′
B. This in turn might
shift B’s beliefs – t′B might assign a higher probability to t
′
P ’s follow up strategy.
We shall explore such dependence of the beliefs of the players on the interpreted
histories, in our extended example in Section 4.5. For the current example, we
assume that the beliefs of P and B are independent of their interpretation of the
current history at ρ4. They are then given in tables 2a and 2b.
βρ4P (tP ) τyes τno τind
tB 0.5 0.3 0
t′B 0 0 0.2
βρ4P (t
′
P ) τyes τno τind
tB 0.3 0.1 0
t′B 0 0 0.6
Table 2a: P’s beliefs about B after the play ρ4
A last piece of business in our basic epistemic set up is this. Recall that the
Jury winning condition Wini for each player i was defined as a subset of the
set of all possible histories of the ME game. Now the interpretations every type
of each player has on the set of possible histories for a play of the ME game
naturally leads to expected utilities, which we define in the Appendix.
βρ4B (tB) σack σqelab
tP 0.5 0
t′P 0 0.5
βρ4B (t
′
B) σack σqelab
tP 0 0.5
t′P 0 0.5
Table 2b: B’s beliefs about P after the play ρ4
4.3 Rationality and common belief in rationality
With the belief structures of our players now set, we can define rationality and
common belief in rationality. Given a play ρ let Eρ ⊂ (T0×S
ρ
0 × T1×S
ρ
1 × TJ ).
Let
Eρi = {(t(1−i), σ(1−i), tJ ) | (t0, σ0, t1, σ1, tJ ) ∈ E
ρ}
and
EρJ = {(t0, σ0, t1, σ1) | (t0, σ0, t1, σ1, tJ ) ∈ E
ρ}
be the events at ρ for Player i and the Jury respectively. Let B(Eρ) ⊂ (T0 ×
Sρ0 × T1 × S
ρ
1 × TJ ) be defined as
B(Eρ) = {(t0, σ0, t1, σ1, tJ ) | (t(1−i), σ(1−i), tJ ) ∈ Bi(E
ρ
i ) and (t0, σ0, t1, σ1) ∈ BJ (E
ρ
J )}
where Bi(E
ρ
i ) and BJ (E
ρ
J ) are the type-strategy pairs that believe in E
ρ
i and
EρJ respectively as defined in the Appendix. Then ‘E
ρ and common belief that
Eρ at ρ’ is defined as the event that Eρ and everyone believes that Eρ at ρ
and everyone believes at ρ that everyone believes that Eρ at ρ and so on. More
formally,
Definition 10 (Common belief). Let
B0(Eρ) = Eρ and for n ≥ 1, Bn(Eρ) = B(Bn−1(Eρ))
Then Eρ and common belief of Eρ at ρ is defined as the following infinite con-
junction:
C(Eρ) =
⋂
n≥0
Bn(Eρ)
We can then define expected payoffs of a strategy for a given type of player
and an appropriate probability distribution p over strategies (see the Appendix),
and henceforth talk of a strategy that maximizes an expected payoff or is a best
response for a particular type of player with respect to p. We use these concepts
to define:
Definition 11 (Rationality and common belief in rationality). For a play
ρ, let R[ρ]i be defined as:
R[ρ]i = {(ti, σi, tJ ) | ti ∈ Ti, tJ ∈ TJ and σi is a best response to p
ρ
ti
for ti}
where pρti is the probability measure over S(1−i) generated by ti as defined in the
Appendix.
These are the type-strategy pairs of Player i where she plays rationally at ρ.
Now, let
R[ρ] = {(t0, σ0, t1, σ1, tJ ) | (t0, σ0, tJ ) ∈ R[ρ]0 and (t1, σ1, tJ ) ∈ R[ρ]1}
R[ρ] is the event that both players play rationally at ρ. Then
RCBR[ρ] = C(R[ρ])
is the event where Rationality and Common Belief in Rationality holds at ρ.
Thus RCBR[ρ] are the type-strategy tuples where both the players are ratio-
nal, each believes that the other is rational, each believes that the other believes
that the other is rational and so on. In addition, the Jury believes that the play-
ers are rational, the players believe that the Jury believes that they are rational
and so on.
Let us now see how RCBR applies to our Example 5, as we have so far
developed it.
Example 6 Recall from Example 5 that after the play
ρ3 = π1π4qap(π1, π4)π2qelab(π4, π2)
type tP of P assigns a probability of 0.5 that B is of type tB and plays a strategy
of the form τyes, a probability of 0.3 that B is of type tB and plays a strategy
of the form τno, and a probability of 0.2 that B is of type t
′
B and he plays a
strategy of the form τind. We also saw in Example 5 that after observing the
move π5∃R · R(π2, π5) by B, which results in the play ρ4, although he forms
different interpretations about the possible histories generated by the move, tP ’s
beliefs about the type-strategy pairs of B do not change.
Let us now look at the two cases envisaged in Example 4, which depended on
how the Jury interprets the play between P and B.
Case (i): whether P acknowledges B’s indirect response or not, the play
remains within WinP . Thus, given our assumptions about possible moves in this
game, both ρ3 and ρ4 are in WinP . Then both σack and σqelab are optimal for tP .
Now, since ρ3 is an flf, let h(ρ3) be the singleton set {h}. Since we are
ignoring the types of the Jury for now and since ρ3 ∈WinP , we have
R[ρ3]P = {(tP , σack), (tP , σqelab), (t
′
P , σack), (t
′
P , σqelab)}
Once P updates his beliefs after observing π5∃R · R(π2, π5), the set of optimal
strategies for him does not change (since ρ4 ∈WinP as well). Thus
R[ρ4]P = {(tP , σack), (tP , σqelab), (t
′
P , σack), (t
′
P , σqelab)} = R[ρ3]P
Similarly, for B,
R[ρ4]B = {(tB , τyes), (tB , τno), (tB , τind)(t
′
B , τyes), (t
′
B , τno), (t
′
B , τind)}
since in case (i), every play in the ME game is losing for B, either immediately
or eventually. So, R[ρ4] = R[ρ4]P × R[ρ4]B. Now, BP (R[ρ4]B) = R[ρ4]P and
BB(R[ρ4]P ) = R[ρ4]B. Thus B(R[ρ4]) = BP (R[ρ4]B) × BB(R[ρ4]P ) = R[ρ4].
Hence RCBR holds for all type-strategy pairs in this case, given how we have
assigned the utilities. Note that P’s and B’s beliefs about each other do not matter
here.
Case (ii): This is the more interesting case, where an acknowledgement of
π5 by P potentially moves the conversation out of WinP . That is to say, ρ5 =
ρ4π3ack(π5, π3) /∈ WinP . In this case, once P updates with the observation of
π5∃R ·R(π2, π5), the acknowledgement σack is not an optimal follow-up for him.
Hence, R[ρ4]P = {(tP , σqelab), (t
′
P , σqelab)}. For B, things are more complicated.
The expected utility of σind for tB is greater than that for his other responses,
because if P is of type tP , which B estimates as having a probability of 0.5,
the conversation has some chance of becoming winning for B and hence have
a non-zero expected utility, whereas his other responses will net him a certain
loss and hence 0 utility. On the other hand, given that a follow up question
will inevitably follow for t′B, any of B’s options are optimal. Thus, R[ρ4]B =
{(tB , τind), (t
′
B , τyes), (t
′
B , τno), (t
′
B , τind)} and R[ρ4] = R[ρ4]P ×R[ρ4]B.
Next, from the tables 2a and 2b, we have that BP (R[ρ4]B) = {(tP , σqelab), (t
′
P , σqelab)} =
R[ρ4]P and BB(R[ρ4]P ) = {(t
′
B , τyes), (t
′
B , τno), (t
′
B , τind)} and B(R[ρ4]) = BB(R[ρ4]P )×
BP (R[ρ4]B). In the next iteration, we have BB(BP (R[ρ4]B)) = BB(R[ρ4]P ) and
BP (BB(R[ρ4]P )) = BP (R[ρ4]B) and we have reached a fixed point. Thus we
have, RCBR[ρ4] = B(R[ρ4]) = {(tP , σqelab), (t
′
P , σqelab)}×{(t
′
B , τyes), (t
′
B , τno), (t
′
B , τind)}.
This accords with intuitions, as in this case it is always optimal for P to ask
a follow-up question to B’s indirect response π5. Type t
′
B of B is the only type
that is sure about this and hence whatever he plays will be losing for him.
4.4 Jury types
The epistemic picture for our original example 1 is still incomplete. In Example
6, type tP of P is not rational, if, as in case (ii), ρ5 /∈WinP . P actually pursued
σack in real life. So manifestly for him, case (i) was what the Jury did. But what
about B? Intuitively, the indirect strategy seems better than the direct answers,
at least in hindsight. Our analysis so far does not capture that. However, to
correctly formulate our intuitions, we need to include in our analysis, types for
the Jury and the players’ estimation of these types. It is the different Jury types
that assign different winning conditions to the game and that is what ultimately
dictates rational conversational behavior or not. And this is incidentally one
reason why postulating a Jury is an essential feature of an ME game.
We now complete our picture by introducing types for the Jury in our running
courtroom example conversation between Bronston and the Prosecutor. This
allows us to perform a complete analysis and reflect on whether Bronston was
indeed rational in his indirect response to the Prosecutor’s question.
Example 7 We preserve the same setting as in Example 6 but now introduce
types for the Jury which were missing so far. Let us first look at the possible types
ξρ4
J
( · ) hcmt hiqap
tj
1
0 1 ∈WinP
tj
2
1 0 ∈WinP
tj
3
0 1 /∈WinP
Table 3a: Types of the Jury and its interpretation structure
for the Jury. We will assume that all Jury types assign all plays conforming to
B’s strategies τyes and τno to WinP .
The Jury types differ, however, in how they treat B’s response π5. As stated
before, π5 has the linguistic implicature (I).
(I) The company had an account in the Swiss banks but Bronston himself did not.
We also assumed that B’s move π5 gives rise to (at least) two histories hcmt
and hiqap. hiqap is the history in which B’s response π5 is treated as implying
(I). Now based on whether the Jury interprets B’s response as hcmt or hiqap
and whether it treats such an interpretation as winning or losing for B, we can
formulate at least three relevant types for the Jury.
tj1: is the type of the Jury who interprets B’s response π5 as (I), treats the play
ρ4 as hiqap and puts it in the winning set for P, WinP . This type exemplifies
the Jury in our case (i) from Example 4.
tj2: is the type of the Jury who does not accept implicature (I) and interprets
ρ4 as hcmt. Such a type takes B not to have answered P’s question and puts
hcmt ∈WinP .
tj3: is the type of the Jury who interprets ρ4 as hiqap but crucially expects more
evidence in (perhaps) the way of more interrogation by the Prosecutor and
hence puts hiqap /∈WinP . This type exemplifies the Jury in our case (ii).
All these types of the Jury determine winning conditions for the players based
solely on the histories corresponding to the play, which they interpret indepen-
dent of their beliefs about the types of the players. Given this, we represent the
interpretations of the Jury types for the play ρ4 with Table 3a.
To consider relevant types for B and P, it is perhaps most intuitive to base
them on their beliefs about the type of the Jury and what they believe about
the beliefs of the opponent about the Jury type. Also, to simplify the analysis,
we consider belief functions that assign probabilities of 0 or 1 only. We further
assume that the beliefs of B are independent of P’s strategies and also of the
current history. Under these assumptions, consider 3 types each of B and P,
denoted as tb1, tb2, tb3 and tp1, tp2, tp3 respectively, such that, tb1 and tp1 believe
that the Jury is of type tj1, tb2 and tp2 believe that the Jury is of type tj2 and
tb3 and tp3 believe that the Jury is of type tj3. These beliefs can be represented
compactly as shown in left Table 3b(i). The first row of that table says that type
tb1 of B believes that the Jury is of type tj1 and also believes that P believes that
βρ4B ( · ) tp1 tp2 tp3 tj1 tj2 tj3
tb1 0 1 0 1 0 0
tb2 0 0 1 0 1 0
tb3 1 0 0 0 0 1
ξρ4B ( · ) hcmt hiqap
tb1 0 1
tb2 0 1
tb3 0 1
Table 3b(i): B’s beliefs about the types of P and the Jury and his interpretations
of the play ρ4
the Jury, on the contrary, is of type tj2. The rows give other options understood
similarly.
It is also intuitive to assume that B indeed intended his move π5 as an indirect
response to P’s question. Hence, every type of B interprets the play ρ4 as hiqap
and this interpretation is independent of the type of P, as represented in the right
Table 3b(i).
Given our assumptions about the Jury, any strategy of the form τyes or τno
is losing for B. Hence, irrespective of the type t of B and his beliefs, the type-
strategy pair (t, τind) is always rational for him. And if he assigns a non-zero
probability to the case that the Jury is actually of type tj3, he stands a chance
of being acquitted. Thus, when B responds with the indirect answer π5 to P’s
question, he is indeed being rational and optimal.
Next we consider three types for P. We shall look at the beliefs of P after the
play ρ4. As in the case of the beliefs of B, we shall assume that the beliefs of P
are independent of the strategies of B. However, at each of the histories hcmt and
hiqap, P’s beliefs are consistent with what he beliefs about the type of the Jury,
which recall were based in turn on the Jury’s interpretation of the the play ρ4.
These beliefs functions are then given by Table 3c(i). Table 3c(i) is read just as
Table 3b(i).
βρ4P (·, hcmt) tb1 tb2 tb3 tj1 tj2 tj3
tp
1
1 0 0 0 1 0
tp
2
1 0 0 0 1 0
tp
3
0 0 1 0 1 0
βρ4P (·, hiqap) tb1 tb2 tb3 tj1 tj2 tj3
tp
1
1 0 0 1 0 0
tp
2
1 0 0 1 0 0
tp
3
0 0 1 0 0 1
Table 3c(i): P’s beliefs about the types of B and the Jury
For the interpretations of ρ4 by P, we assume that they are in agreement with
what each type of P believes about the interpretation of ρ4 by the Jury and are
independent of the type of B. Then, the interpretation function of P for ρ4 is
given as in Table 3c(ii).
So, among these types and beliefs, which type-strategy pairs of P are rational?
There are 5 such pairs:
ξρ4P ( · , tj1) hcmt hiqap
tp
1
0 1
tp
2
0 1
tp
3
0 1
ξρ4P ( · , tj2) hcmt hiqap
tp
1
1 0
tp
2
1 0
tp
3
1 0
ξρ4P ( · , tj3) hcmt hiqap
tp
1
0 1
tp
2
0 1
tp
3
0 1
Table 3c(ii): P’s interpretations of the play ρ4
– (tp1, σack) and (tp1, σqelab): Indeed, because P himself interprets the current
history as hiqap and believes that the Jury does the same, accepting the ob-
vious implicature (I) of B’s response π5 making continuations of such plays
winning for P. Hence he can either go on, having been assured of a commit-
ment, or ask a follow up question.
– (tp2, σack) and (tp2, σqelab): Since P himself interprets the current history as
hcmt and also believes that the Jury does not take on implicature (I) of B’s
response interpreting the current history as hcmt, he may point out that B
hasn’t answered his question or acknowledge B’s response having been assured
of a win.
– (tp3, σqelab): Here P believes that the Jury expects him to follow up on his
initial question and he obliges with σqelab.
In the actual conversation, since P did acknowledge B’s response π5, we
conclude that P was either type tp1 and believed that the Jury was of type tj1 or
he was of type tp2 and believed that the Jury was of type tj2. Hence, given his
beliefs, P was rational in acknowledging B’s response.
By assigning the Jury types, we have explained the conversational behavior
of Bronston and the Prosecutor in a much more rigorous and satisfactory way
than is possible in [3] or [5]. There is an additional advantage to assigning the
Jury types. We can now introduce uncertainty on the part of the players as to the
Jury’s type. This means we can model the fact that players cannot reliably esti-
mate neither the Jury winning conditions, nor the number of turns after which
the Jury will decide to end the game and not even the weighting function of the
Jury (if it uses one for the estimation of the winning conditions as described in
[4]). They can only form beliefs about these parameters and strategize accord-
ingly. This prevents troublesome Backwards Induction arguments discussed in
[5], in cases where it is common knowledge that the ME game is finite.
4.5 A more complex example
We have now introduced our key epistemic concepts and illustrated them with
our simple Bronston example. In that example, the updates of beliefs are rather
trivial. We now turn to a more complex example, also discussed in [5], to illustrate
the interdependence of a player’s interpretation function and belief function.
Example 8 As background to this excerpt from a press conference by Senator
Coleman’s spokesman Sheehan, Senator Coleman was running for re-election as
a senator from Minnesota in the 2008 US elections.
S.a Reporter: On a different subject is there a reason that the Senator won’t say whether or
not someone else bought some suits for him?
S.b Sheehan: Rachel, the Senator has reported every gift he has ever received.
S.c Reporter: That wasn’t my question, Cullen.
S.d Sheehan: (i) The Senator has reported every gift he has ever received. (ii) We are not
going to respond to unnamed sources on a blog.
S.e Reporter: So Senator Coleman’s friend has not bought these suits for him? Is that correct?
S.f Sheehan: The Senator has reported every gift he has ever received.
Sheehan continues to repeat, The Senator has reported every gift he has ever received seven
more times in two minutes to every follow up question by the reporter corps.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VySnpLoaUrI
To formulate (8) as an ME game, we assume two active players (i) the reporter
corps (R) and (i) spokesman Sheehan (S). The play in (8), as well as some
alternative moves, exploits the following EDU characterizations.
1. R: 〈π0 : On a different subject is there a reason that the Senator won’t say whether or not
someone else bought some suits for him? (φ0)〉
2. R: 〈π2 : That wasn’t my question, Cullen. (φ2)〉
3. R: 〈π5 : So Senator Coleman’s friend has not bought these suits for him? (φ5)〉 〈π6 : Is
that correct? (φ6)〉
4. R: 〈π22 := Ok. (φ
2
2)〉
5. S: 〈π1α : Rachel, the Senator has reported every gift he has ever received. (φα)〉
6. S: 〈π2α : The Senator has reported every gift he has ever received. (φα) 〉 〈π3 : We are not
going to respond to unnamed sources on a blog. (φ3)〉
7. S: 〈π3α :The Senator has reported every gift he has ever received. (φα)〉
8. S: 〈π21 :=Yes. (φ
2
1)〉
9. S: 〈π31 :=No. (φ
3
1)〉
The ulf given below for (8) represents a play in an ME game, which we
denote as ρ.
ρ =〈π0 : φ0〉〈π1 : π0π
1
α∃R1.R1(π0, π
1
α)〉〈π2 : π
1
2corr(π1, π
1
2)〉
〈π8 : 〈π4 : π
2
απ3exp(π
2
α, π3)∃R2∃x.R2(x, π4)〉〉
〈π9 : 〈π7 : π5π6confQ(π5, π6)〉∃z.res(z, π7)〉〈π10 : π
3
α∃R3∃y.R3(y, π
3
α)〉
|ρ| = 6 and let ρ0, ρ1, . . . , ρ6, where ρ0 = ǫ be the prefixes of ρ after 0, 1, . . . , 6
turns of the game respectively (that is, ρ6 = ρ). Note that the ulf ρ has three
underspecified relations R1,R2,R3 as well as two underspecified arguments.
The CDU π1 groups together π0 and π
1
α as well as the underspecified relation
R1, which is clearly the target of the correction prompted by π
1
2 . In SDRT, to
target a relation instance that is corrected, the correction must take scope over a
CDU containing that relation instance. It is also uncontroversial that explanation
holds between π2α and π3 and that a confirmation question relation holds between
π5 and π6. On the other hand it is unclear how to connect either π
2
α or the
CDU π4 to the prior discourse structure; the same situation holds for π
3
α. We
have noted that the left arguments of these two underspecified relations is itself
underspecified by existentially quantifying over those arguments. The explicit
discourse connector So signals a result between π4, π8, or some other DU and
the CDU π7, formed from π5 and π6.
ρ serves as the spine of the game tree depicted in Figure 3. The relation
instances whose arguments are underspecified are drawn in red.
π0:qtn
π31 :no
π1α : φα
π21 :yes
qap
R1
qap
π1
π12 :notQ
π22 :OK
corr
ack
π2
π33 :no
π2α : φα
π3:blog
exp
π4
π23 :yes
qap
R2
qap
π8
π5:nosuits
π6:right?
conf-Q
π7
π25 :OK
res
ack
π9
π3α : φα
π17 :yes
π27 :no
R3
qap
qap
Fig. 3: An ME game structure for the initial part of the conversation between R
and S.
Now, we can imagine two types for Sheehan: tH and tD.
– tH is the ‘honest’ type, according to which Sheehan truly implicates that
the Senator did not receive the suits and that he simply does not want to
respond to this charge.
– tD is the ‘dishonest’ type, according to which Coleman received the suits but
did not declare them and Sheehan is trying to cover this fact up.
We can identify the Jury with the reporter corps or in general with the
audience present in that room during the interview or even with everyone for
whom the interview is relevant. We envisage two types for the Jury: tjU and tjB .
– tjU is the ‘unbiased’ Jury that starts out with a presumption of full disclosure
and honesty from Sheehan.
– tjB is the type of the Jury that is disposed to believe whatever the spokesman
says, because, for example, they are from the same political party. Such a
Jury is ‘biased’.
π0:qtn
π1α : φα
π12 :notQ
π2α : φα π
1
3 :blog
π5:nosuits π6:right?
π3α : φα
bcknd
π1
corr
π2
exp
π4
bcknd
conf-Q
π7
π8
res
π9
h1
bcknd
π0:qtn
π1α : φα
π12 :notQ
π2α : φα π
1
3 :blog
π5:nosuits π6:right?
π3α : φα
iqap
π1
corr
π2
exp
π4
corr
conf-Q
π7
π8
res
π9
h2
corr
Fig. 4: Two histories resulting from two different interpretations of the uninter-
preted relations in ρ
Now, ρ can have at least two different interpretations giving rise to two
different histories h1 and h2.
h1 =〈π0 : φ0〉〈π1 : π0π
1
αbcknd(π0, π
1
α)〉〈π2 : π
1
2corr(π1, π
1
2)〉
〈π8 : 〈π4 : π
2
απ3exp(π
2
α, π3)bcknd(π2, π4)〉〉
〈π9 : 〈π7 : π5π6confQ(π5, π6)〉res(π8, π7)〉〈π10 : π
3
αbcknd(π9, π
3
α)〉
h2 =〈π0 : φ0〉〈π1 : π0π
1
αiqap(π0, π
1
α)〉〈π2 : π
1
2corr(π1, π
1
2)〉
〈π8 : 〈π4 : π
2
απ3exp(π
2
α, π3)corr(π2, π4)〉〉
〈π9 : 〈π7 : π5π6confQ(π5, π6)〉res(π8, π7)〉〈π10 : π
3
αcorr(π9, π
3
α)〉
We can depict these histories graphically as in Figure 4. We let h1j , h
2
j , j ∈
{0, 1, . . . , 6} be the prefixes of h1 and h2 respectively after j turns where h10 =
h20 = ǫ.
The types tjU and tjB of the Jury have different priors concerning S’s types.
tjU starts with an indifference between tH and tD, while tjB starts off believing
S is of type tH , with a high probability (say 0.7). We assume that the beliefs of
the Jury are independent of the strategies of S. Then their beliefs on the types
of S can be given as in Table 4a. We also assume that throughout the course
of the game, whenever a Jury interprets ρ or any prefix of it as history h1 it
is indifferent between the types tH and tD of S and whenever it interprets ρ or
any prefix of it as history h2 it assigns a higher probability to the type tH of S.
This is irrespective of the type of the Jury itself. This is represented in Table 4a
where j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 6}.
βρ0
J
( · , ǫ) tH tD
tjU 0.5 0.5
tjB 0.7 0.3
β
ρj
J
(·) tH tD
h1 0.5 0.5
h2 0.7 0.3
Table 4a: The beliefs of the Jury about the type of S before the start of the game
and the beliefs of the Jury about the type of S throughout the play ρ
Now as the play ρ progresses, the types tjU and tjB of the Jury end up
interpreting ρ differently, as h1 and h2 respectively. These interpretations are
intuitively justified as follows. We will give a qualitative analysis for readabil-
ity, though we could have given actual numbers for the probability values and
computed the belief updates in every step.
– Beliefs and interpretations of type tjU : When type tjU updates with
the unexpected φα as a response to 〈π0 :qtn〉, it is genuinely puzzled by
the response. While it is natural to assume that an honest senator has never
received any gifts from a friend which he has not reported, the inference from
φα as an answer to π0, as to why the Senator has not said anything about the
suits, is complicated and indirect. A Jury must consider the interpretation of
S.a and S.b conditioned on both tD and tH . Conditioning on the assumption
that S is of type tD and S’s response α, the Jury, like R, assigns a much
higher probability to the interpretation illustrated in h1, that S.b does not
answer S.a and is rather related to it via background. That is,
ξρ2J (tjU , tD)(h
1
2) >> ξ
ρ2
J (tjU , tD)(h
2
2)
On the other hand, conditioning on the assumption that S is of type tH and
the response α, the Jury confers only a slightly higher probability to an iqap
relation than a background relation between S.a and S.b. That is,
ξρ2J (tjU , tH)(h
1
2) > ξ
ρ2
J (tjU , tH)(h
2
2)
When we combine the probabilities over tD and tH—because tj1 is consider-
ing both—we get a higher probability for background than for iqap, leading
to a higher probability of h12.
ξρ2J (tjU )(h
1
2) > ξ
ρ2
J (tjU )(h
2
2)
Combining this with how the believes are derived as given by Table 4a, we
can conclude that:
βρ2J (tjU )(tH) > β
ρ2
J (tjU )(tD)
Next, conditioning in turn on this belief, tjU naturally interprets R’s response
π12 as a correction of S’s move as implicating any kind of answer and hence
implicating R’s request for a direct answer to π0. In π
2
α, however, S reiterates
his original response, and explains why he does so in π3: the Senator and
his staff do not want to comment on unnamed sources on some blog. So
at this point tjU might lean back towards h
2
4, interpreting π4 as correcting
the exchange in π2. Hence we have ξ
ρ4
J (tjU )(h
2
4) = 1. tjU then takes up the
natural conclusion from φα as an iqap to π0, which would be the upshot
of S’s correction of R’s correction—namely, that S had in fact replied to
R’s question in π1α. This is shown in both h
1 and h2 by linking π8 to π7
and marking the relation between them as result. R also follows up with a
confirmation question to S that this is so (π6). At this point we still have
ξρ5J (tjU )(h
2
5) = 1. However to this, S replies with φα once again in (S.f),
which yields the EDU π3α. Now tjU is confused. Why is S not replying with
a direct answer yes or no? Is the Senator in fact dishonest, of type tD, and
S is trying to hide this fact? tjU shift backs to the history h
1, and treat the
links between π4 and π2 and between π
3
α and π9 as background. The belief
of tjU about the type of S has shifted towards tD now, which means φα is
taken as an evading of the question. We would thus have ξρJ (h
1) = 1 and
this, according to Table 4a, leads to βρJ (tjU )(tH) = β
ρ
J (tjU )(tD) = 0.5.
– Beliefs and interpretations of type tjB: Given its high confidence that S
is of type tH , the Jury type tjB accepts φα as a perfectly acceptable indirect
answer to π0 and so opts for the history h
2’s interpretation of that first
underspecified relation.
ξρ2J (tjB , tH)(h
2
2) >> ξ
ρ2
J (tjB , tH)(h
1
2)
It would also interpret the relation R2 of ρ as a correction as in h
2, it would
construct a different history after π6. It would see each repetition of φα as
another correction of R’s attempts to reopen a topic that that S has already
settled. Since S is of type tH (with a high probability), he need not continue
the discussion of a matter that has already been labeled as one that Sheehan
will not comment on. Thus after ρ, ξρJ (tjB)(h
2) = 1 and hence by Table 4a,
βρJ (tjB)(tH) = 0.7 and β
ρ
J (tjB)(tD) = 0.3.
Next, let us analyse the conversation as it proceeded after (S.e). S in effect
refuses to engage with R by repeating φα to every follow up question on the
topic. We see how this explicit linguistic uncooperativity (in the sense of [3])
affects the Jury’s estimation of the Senator’s type, given that it keeps revising
its beliefs according to Bayesian updates.
Let us assume that every relevant ensuing coherent move by R consists of
the single question EDU:
φQ =Has the Senator received gifts from his friend?
This is a simplification of what actually happened but all the actual questions
were in fact follow up questions to φQ or questions related to it. So to simplify
the presentation, we’ll treat them all as question φQ.
S has three consistent coherent moves: φ21, φ
3
1 and φα where
– φ21 is a positive response from S: yes, the Senator has received gifts from his friend.
– φ31 is a negative response: no, the Senator has never received gifts from his friend.
– φα is the response: the Senator has reported every gift he has ever received.
The ME game after (S.f) looks as shown in Figure 5 where again the dashed
edges represent continuations which are irrelevant to the present analysis.
ρ5
φ31
qap
φα φQ
φ31
qap
φα φQ
φ31
qap
φαR5
φ21
qap
q-fuR4
φ21
qap
q-fuR3
φ21
qap
Fig. 5: The ME game of Eg. 8 after ρ5
Although S repeats φα 7 more times after ρ5 in the press conference contain-
ing (8), for simplicity of this analysis, we shall consider only 3 rounds after play
of the above game. Let ρ6, ρ7 and ρ8 be the extension of ρ5 after each of these
rounds, where ρ6 = ρ. As before, each of these plays can be interpreted in two
different ways: (i) histories of the form h1j where the relations R3,R4 and R5
are interpreted as bcknd and (ii) histories of the form h2j where the relations R3,
R4 and R5 are interpreted as corr.
There are 7 strategies of S that are relevant for these three rounds which are
given by the set: SS = {σ1, σ2, . . . , σ7} and are presented in Table 4b.
round 1 round 2 round 3
σ1 φ
2
1 ≡yes – –
σ2 φ
3
1 ≡no – –
σ3 φα φ
2
1 ≡yes –
σ4 φα φ
3
1 ≡no –
σ5 φα φα φ
2
1 ≡yes
σ6 φα φα φ
3
1 ≡no
σ7 φα φα φα
Table 4b: The relevant strategies of S after the play ρ
Let us now look at how each of the types tjU and tjB of the Jury would
update its beliefs about S’s type given the course of the conversation after ρ5.
Jury type tjU We saw that tjU is the fair type that ends up interpreting ρ
as h1 with turn (S.f). It starts off the game believing with a probability of 0.5
that S is of an honest type tH , which it maintains after the two of responses φα
by S in ρ. That is, it assigns an equal probability to S being of type tH or tD
after (S.f). We assume that such tjU sticks to this interpretation also after the
rounds following ρ. That is, it interprets ρ7 and ρ8 as h17 and h
1
8. However, such
a Jury type would expect that if S is indeed of type tH then he would eventually
give the direct answer φ71 ≡no to the confirmation question in π6. In addition,
for simplicity, suppose that tjU believes that is it equally likely for S to give a
direct answer to φQ in any of the three rounds that we have considered after
(S.f). Given all the above assumptions, we represent the beliefs of the Jury type
tjU after the play ρ as shown in Table 4c(i) (with all calculations to 3-decimal
precision).
βρ
J
(tjU ) σ1 σ2 σ3 σ4 σ5 σ6 σ7
tH 0 0.167 0 0.167 0 0.166 0
tD 0.125 0 0.125 0 0.125 0 0.125
Table 4c(i): The beliefs of the Jury type tjU about the type-strategy pair of S
after ρ
Now, let EρH be the J -event that S is of type tH and E
ρ
D be the J -event
that he is of type tD. Formally, E
ρ
H = {tH} × SS and E
ρ
D = {tD} × SS . After
the play ρ we have that βρJ (tjU )(E
ρ
H) = β
ρ
J (tjU )(E
ρ
D) = 0.5.
The strategies of S that are compatible with the play ρ7 are S7S = {σ3, σ4, σ5, σ6, σ7}.
Hence, we can define the J -events Eρ
7
H = {tH} × S
7
S , E
ρ7
D = {tD} × S
7
S and
Eρ
7
= Eρ
7
H ∪ E
ρ7
D .
Now, βρJ (tjU )(E
ρ7) = 0.708. Suppose the Jury derives its beliefs after ρ7 by
performing a Bayesian update of its beliefs after ρ. Let j ∈ {4, 6}. Then we have
βρ
7
J (tjU )(〈tH , σj〉) = β
ρ
J (tjU )(〈tH , σj〉 | E
ρ7) = 0.167/0.708 = 0.238
and for k ∈ {3, 5, 7}
βρ
7
J (tjU )(〈tD, σk〉) = β
ρ
J (tjU )(〈tD, σk〉 | E
ρ7) = 0.125/0.708 = 0.175
Thus after the first round of the repetition of φα by S, the beliefs of Jury
type tjU , after Bayesian updates, can be represented as shown in Table 4c(ii).
We have βρ
7
J (tjU )(E
ρ7
H ) = 0.476 and β
ρ7
J (tjU )(E
ρ7
D ) = 0.525 (as can be seen
by summing the individual rows of Table 4c(ii)).
βρ
7
J
(tjU ) σ3 σ4 σ5 σ6 σ7
tH 0 0.238 0 0.238 0
tD 0.175 0 0.175 0 0.175
Table 4c(ii): The beliefs of the Jury type tjU after ρ
7
Next, the strategies that are compatible with ρ8 are S8S = {σ5, σ6, σ7}. As
before, we can define the events Eρ
8
H = {tH} × S
8
S , E
ρ8
D = {tD} × S
8
S and E
ρ8 =
Eρ
8
H ∪ E
ρ8
D and hence β
ρ7
J (tjU )(E
ρ8) = 0.587. We have, as before
βρ
8
J (tjU )(〈tH , σ6〉) = β
ρ7
J (tjU )(〈tH , σ6〉 | E
ρ8) = 0.238/0.587 = 0.404
and for j ∈ {5, 7}
βρ
8
J (tjU )(〈tD, σk〉) = β
ρ7
J (tjU )(〈tD, σj〉 | E
ρ8) = 0.175/0.587 = 0.298
Thus, βρ
8
J (tjU )(E
ρ8
H ) = 0.404 and β
ρ8
J (tjU )(ED(ρ
8)) = 0.596. So after round 2,
and after Bayesian updates, the type tjU of the Jury believes even more that S
is of type tD and not of type tH .
The beliefs of tjU after each round of the conversation can be represented
pictorially as shown in Figure 6.
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Fig. 6: The progressive change in the beliefs of the Jury type tjU about the type
of S
Given these calculations, we can imagine that a Jury of type tjU might then
stop the conversation once the probability of tD becomes high enough. For such
a Jury, S’s repetitions doom his play to be losing.
Jury type tjB We next perform a similar analysis for the Jury type tjB which
has a different interpretation of S’s repeated responses φα. As we saw in our
earlier discussion, such a Jury type interprets the play ρ as the history h2. It is
ready to believe that S has indeed “settled the topic” with his response π3. Any
attempt to re-open the topic would simply be unneccessary and hence such a
Jury type is perfectly happy with S’s response φα to R’s repeated question φQ.
We argued that after the play ρ the Jury type tjB comes away assigning a rather
high probability (0.7 say) to S being of the honest type tH . As in the previous
case we again analyse the game for three more rounds after ρ again assuming
that S has the strategy set SS at his disposal. We assume that such tjB sticks
to its interpretation also after the rounds following ρ and interprets ρ7 and ρ8
as h27 and h
2
8. tjB takes S’s response φα as being compatible with his type tH .
The only case where S would reveal his type to be tD is when he gives the direct
answer φ21 ≡yes to R’s question φQ. Hence, this time, we can represent the beliefs
of the Jury type tjB after the play ρ as shown in Table 4d(i).
β[ρ]J (tjB) σ1 σ2 σ3 σ4 σ5 σ6 σ7
tH 0 0.175 0 0.175 0 0.175 0.175
tD 0.1 0 0.1 0 0.1 0 0
Table 4d(i): The beliefs of the Jury type tjU about the type-strategy pair of S
after ρ given the history h1
Let, as in the previous case, EρH be the event that S is of type tH and E
J
D be
the event that he is of type tD. That is, E
ρ
H = {tH} × SS and ED = {tD} × SS .
After the play ρ we have that βρJ (tjB)(E
ρ
H) = 0.7 and β
ρ
J (tjB)(E
ρ
D) = 0.3.
Once again, the strategies of S that are compatible with ρ7 are S7S = {σ3, σ4, σ5, σ6, σ7}.
We define the events Eρ
7
H = {tH} × S
7
S , E
ρ7
D = {tD} × S
7
S and E
ρ7 = Eρ
7
H ∪E
ρ7
D .
Now, βρJ (tjB)(E
ρ7) = 0.725. Let j ∈ {4, 6, 7}. Then we have
βρ
7
J (tjB)(〈tH , σj〉) = β
ρ
J (tjB)(〈tH , σj〉 | E
ρ7) = 0.175/0.725 = 0.241
and for k ∈ {3, 5}
βρ
7
J (tjB)(〈tD, σk〉) = β
ρ
J (tjB)(〈tD, σk〉 | E
ρ7) = 0.1/0.725 = 0.138
Thus after round 1, the beliefs of Jury type tjB , after Bayesian updates, can
be represented as shown in Table 4d(ii).
We have βρ
7
J (tjB)(E
ρ7
H ) = 0.724 and β
ρ7
J (tjB)(E
ρ7
D ) = 0.276 (as can be seen
by summing the individual rows of Table 4d(ii)).
Next, the strategies that are compatible with ρ8 are S8S = {σ5, σ6, σ7}. As
before, we can define the events Eρ
8
H = {tH} × S
8
S , E
ρ8
D = {tD} × S
8
S and E
ρ8 =
βρ
7
J
(tjB) σ3 σ4 σ5 σ6 σ7
tH 0 0.241 0 0.241 0.242
tD 0.138 0 0.138 0 0
Table 4d(ii): The beliefs of the Jury type tjB after ρ
7
Eρ
8
H ∪ E
ρ8
D and hence β
ρ7
J (tjB)(E
ρ8) = 0.620. We have, as before, for j ∈ {6, 7}
βρ
8
J (tjB)(〈tH , σj〉) = β
ρ7
J (tjB)(〈tH , σj〉 | E
ρ8) = 0.241/0.620 = 0.389
and
βρ
8
J (tjB)(〈tD, σ5〉) = β
ρ7(tjB)(〈tD, σ5〉 | E
ρ7) = 0.138/0.620 = 0.222
Thus, βρ
8
J (tjB)(E
ρ8
H ) = 0.778 and β
ρ8
J (tjB)(E
ρ8
D ) = 0.2226. So after round 2, and
after the Bayesian updates, the belief of the type tjB that S is of the honest type
tH is strengthened even further.
The beliefs of tjB after each round of the conversation can be represented
pictorially as shown in Figure 7.
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Fig. 7: The progressive change in the beliefs of the Jury type tjB about the type
of S
4.6 Confirmation of bias
Example (8) gives us an insight into the nature of the evaluations of strategic
conversations by different types of Juries. While the Jury of type tjF was ar-
guably guided by facts and evidence in deriving its beliefs and updating them,
tjB was more inclined to favour S in its evaluation of the exchange. It had pre-
conceived beliefs about the type of S being honest and interpreted his messages
φα as such. These interpretations, in turn, served to further strengthen its be-
liefs about the type of S being tjB which then influenced its interpretations of
φα more and more in the later stages of the exchange.
This points to an interesting and intuitive truth about interpretation: a Jury
with a prior disposition towards a player type is guided by it in its interpre-
tation of the messages in the conversation. Surprisingly, this in turn serves to
strengthen its disposition further in turn effecting its subsequent interpretations
of the conversation. We formalise this phenomenon as follows.
Suppose there are two types for a player t1 and t2 and let ρ be a play of the
ME game. Suppose ρ can be interpreted in two strands of histories h1 and h2.
Suppose tJ is a Jury type whose beliefs about the type of the player are given
as in Table 5. ǫ : 0 < ǫ ≤ 1/4 is called the index of bias. The table says that as
the Jury type tJ interprets longer and longer prefixes of ρ as h
1, it is more and
more likely to believe that the player is of type t1.
β
ρj
J
(tJ , · ) t1 t2
h1j 0.5 +
∑j
k=1 ǫ
j 0.5−
∑j
k=1 ǫ
j
h2j 0.5 0.5
ξ
ρj
J
(tJ , · ) h
1
j h
2
j
t1 1 0
t2 0 1
Table 5: Beliefs and interpretations of the Jury type tJ
Also, suppose tj interprets the prefixes of ρ as given in Table 5. That is, if
tJ believes that the player is of type t1 then it interprets the current prefix of ρ
as h1 and if it believes that the player type is t2 then it interprets it as h
2.
Now, suppose ǫ = 0.25 and suppose tJ interprets the play ρ1 (after the first
turn) as h11. From Table 5 we have that tJ believes with probability 0.5+0.25
1 =
0.75 that the player is of type t1 and with a probability 0.25 that she is of type
t2. This means that after the next turn, from Table 5 we have that it is likely to
interpret ρ2 as h
1
2 with the higher probability of 0.75 and as h
2
2 with the lower
probability of 0.25. So suppose tJ does interpret ρ2 as h
1
2. Then again from Table
5 we have that tJ believes with probability 0.5 + 0.25
1 + 0.252 = 0.875 that the
player is of type t1 and with a probability 0.125 that she is of type t2. This means
that after the next turn, from Table 5 we have that it is likely to interpret ρ3 as
h13 with the higher probability of 0.875 and as h
2
3 with the lower probability of
0.125. We can carry out a similar analysis for all the ensuing turns.
This leads us to make the following general observation.
Observation 1 (Confirmation of bias) In a strategic conversation if a Jury
assigns a higher belief probability to a particular type t of a player (participant)
and if it interprets the underspecified discourse relations of the play of the ME
game corresponding to the conversation in tune with its beliefs about the player
types then such interpretations strengthen its belief on t. This in turn shifts its
beliefs further towards t in the consecutive rounds of the conversation biasing
its interpretations of the underspecified relations in the subsequent rounds even
further.
In our treatment of Example 8, we saw already a case of a Jury, the one
of type tjB , with a predisposition to a particular type for one of the players. It
is a special case of our generalization above. However, we also saw that a Jury
without such a predisposition, the one of type tjU , could also fix upon a certain
history and then instill and reinforce a particular view of one of the players. As
we argued, tjU also changes its beliefs as to which history is more probable during
the course of interpretation. This happened because tjU took the linguistic cues,
in particular the repetition of α in response to its attempt to confirm h2, to
shift its belief in h2 to a belief in h1, which in turn reinforced the probability of
Sheehan as tD. It is possible, however, for a Jury to switch from a history h to
h′ even if the prior probability of h is high, provided the linguistic evidence is
sufficiently strong in favor of h′.
A very important question at this point comes to mind:
Question 1 When is a Jury biased? What constitutes an unbiased Jury?
We do not have a definite answer to what an unbiased Jury is. An unbiased
Jury gives all (relevant) player types an equal chance and interpret plays in
light of this. Secondly, an unbiased Jury is indifferent about the identities of
the players. That is to say that if it assigns win to Player i for a play ρ, then
it should assign win to Player (1 − i) for the play which has the exact same
discourse moves and relations as ρ but where the roles of the players have been
interchanged. We thus list here two necessary conditions that an unbiased Jury
must intuitively satisfy.
Towards that we first define the notion of the dual of a play of an ME game.
Let (v, i) ∈ (V0 ∪ V1)
ω be an element of the labeled vocabulary. Define its dual
as:
(v, i) = (v, 1− i)
The dual of a play ρ ∈ ((V0 ∪ V1)
ω)∞ then is simply the lifting of this operator
over the entire sequence of ρ. That is, if ρ = x0x1x2 . . ., where x0 = ǫ then
ρ = x0x1 x2 . . .
We now state the two constraints that an unbiased Jury must necessarily
satisfy.
– Indifference towards player identity: A Jury J = (Win0,Win1) is un-
biased if for every ρ ∈ (V0 ∪ V1)
ω, ρ ∈Wini iff ρ ∈Win(1−i).
– Symmetry of prior belief: A Jury is unbiased if it has symmetrical prior
beliefs about the player types and no bias in its interpretation of the plays
of the ME game. For instance, in our above analysis, such a Jury would be
characterized as having p = 0.5 in its prior beliefs about the player types
and ǫ = 0.
An unbiased Jury is thus indifferent between the identity of the participants
and evaluates a conversation based solely on the strength of the points put forth
by them. A biased Jury however, has a more ‘selective’ listening. It is often blind
to the inconsistencies and the factual errors of the participants towards whom it
is biased. There are numerous examples where the 2016 Presidential candidate
Trump asserted inconsistencies and factual errors throughout his campaign. This
did not stop his supporters from voting for him in anyway.
The second necessary condition above for an unbiased Jury leads to a re-
markable conclusion. Assuming that the prior beliefs of the Jury are assigned
uniformly at random (or according to some other continuous distribution), a
simple measure-theoretic argument convinces us that
Observation 2 (Biased Jury) Almost surely, a Jury is always biased.
Signaling games in retrospect We end this section with a brief comparison
of our analysis of the subjectivity of interpretation and that given by signaling
games. signaling games typically analyze the meaning of a signal in terms of
reflective equilibrium. As this equilibrium depends on the beliefs of the players,
signaling games also predict that interpretation can be subjective. Epistemic
ME games take the meaning, which may include implicatures, of elements of
a play to be exogenously determined; ME games exploit linguistic theory to
constrain what elements in the signal are subject to linguistic interpretation.
As we mentioned earlier, the assumption of exogenous meaning is necessary to
get a well-defined interpretation in cases where players’ interests are opposed,
as argued in detail in [5].
The use of SDRT in ME games, a formal theory of discourse interpretation,
isolates a crucial component for subjective and biased interpretation that is
missing in standard signaling games: the way an interpreter links the discourse
units in a given play in terms of discourse relations. Such links are crucial to
the Jury’s bias in the analysis of example (8). This point generalizes to other,
lexical ambiguities. But as discourse connections ultimately determine whether
the speaker is making a relevant contribution to the conversation and are often
underspecified, they seem particularly apt at generating biased interpretations.
A final difference between signaling games and epistemic ME games is that
signaling games have a built in asymmetry in their treatment of the receiver and
sender. The sender has complete information but the receiver does not. In an
epistemic ME game, this asymmetry is no longer present, as intuitions would
dictate; as conversation proceeds, the conversational participants take turns at
being speakers and hearers and the result both speaker and hearer have imperfect
information about each other but also learn about each other’s type. Thus ME
games are much more general than signaling games. However, note that it is
simple to model signaling games in the setting of ME games – the Jury declares
the winner after the first two turns of the ME game.
5 Conclusion
In adding notions from epistemic game theory to ME games, we have shown
how types account for certain conversational strategies and how they influence
interpretation. We’ve shown that players strategize about their options given
the types they assign to the Jury and to each other. We’ve also seen how the
Jury updates its assessment of player types based on their contributions and
determines whether the play is winning or losing for one of the players. Such
reassessments of types also affect the interpretation of a discourse move and
in the fashioning of a history out of an underspecified play. This allowed us to
explain why bias is a natural outcome of interpretation and how it crucially
depends on the underspecification of discourse connections between speakers’
contributions. Our use of formal theories of discourse interpretation as providing
the vocabulary of ME games provides a much more nuanced view of subjectivity
in interpretation than has been proposed using signaling games [11].
Types are basically a device for assigning probabilities to other types, and
ultimately to strategies, which in ME games are a function of the probabilities
assigned to the types of the other players and of the Jury. We’ve shown that types
furnish a linguistically unstudied but important component of interpretation.
Even the construction of a logical form for a conversation is subject to type
of the interpreter, which is common sensical enough but is something which
linguistic theories have largely ignored.
Griceans and Neo-Griceans argue that speaker intentions are crucial to in-
terpretation; but this misconstrues the contribution of epistemic information.
Interpreters don’t have access to the intentions and beliefs of the speaker, they
have only their own beliefs about the speaker that interact with conventional cues
for linguistic meaning. What is crucial for interpretation are the uncertain be-
liefs that interpreters have about the speaker, beliefs about the speaker’s beliefs,
which include the speaker’s beliefs about the interpreters, her goals, and what
she wants to do. Types encode this information in a formally precise framework.
Parametrizing SDRS construction and discourse interpretation to types has
has several interesting consequences. The first is that it generalizes and formalizes
an idea from [13, 17] that different conversational participants may construct dif-
ferent SDRSs for a given dialogue that nevertheless share some structure. This
also makes a difference to commitments as [17] explain; in saying something
speaker 0 may take herself to commit to p but player 1 may take 0 to commit to
q, which may then be the basis for what 1 contributes next. Parametrizing inter-
pretation relative to types while keeping basic meaning constant, means that any
two such SDRSs will, assuming no processing errors, share the set of edus but
may differ on how these are related or combined into larger cdus. Of course two
interlocutors might both have the same type and then would perforce construct
the same SDRS. Parametrizing interpretation relative to types also predicts that
what interpretation results may shift as we consider higher order beliefs about
types, something not considered in other work in semantics or discourse, as far as
we know. Finally, this mechanism predicts that as probabilities assigned to types
are updated, interlocutors may revise their interpretation of the contributions
of their conversational partners, another intuitively compelling point.
A second consequence of this view opens up some intriguing generalizations
about how linguistic interpretation can confirm expectations. As we saw in case
iv with the biased Jury for the example about Sheehan, since types help de-
termine the interpretation of an exchange and that exchange in turn helps one
update ones’ views about the types of the interlocutors, assigning a high proba-
bility to a particular type can be further confirmed by how it influences or even
“writes” the discourse history. This predicts that biased Juries may hear “only
what they want to hear” and that they do not change their minds even in the
face of evidence that would convince an unbiased Jury.
The third consequence of this view is that people with different beliefs or
even different moods (e.g. the interpreter is very angry or very suspicious) may
produce different interpretations of a conversation. Different people, or the same
person in different moods, can interpret the same verbal signal differently, though
the exact parameters of variation would have to be (and perhaps already has
been) made precise and empirically tested. Types can also be used to encode the
variation in conversational interpretation between normal interpreters and neu-
rally or cognitively impaired people. This opens up a large space of investigation
that we leave for future research.
The use of types in interpretation also raises some important questions. What
types are relevant to interpretation? The space of types is itself vast and raises
technical difficulties for the existence of optimal strategies [6], but our intuitions
tell us that typically the types relevant to a particular conversation are rather
few. A fair interpretation imposes constraints on the set of relevant types, but
at present we do not understand how this set is picked out.
We leave open several extensions to this work. The first concerns the notion
of a fair conversational setting. Conversations, esp. strategic ones, if allowed to
continue in an unrestricted fashion, may become unfair. For instance, it might
be the case that the player i who gets the opportunity to speak first might not
concede the turn to the other player(s) (1−i) thus having an unfair advantage. Or
i might talk over (1 − i) not allowing her to have her turn.4 Conversationalists
are aware, at least implicitly, of the dangers of such cases and debates have
exogenous means of ensuring that there are optimal strategies for the speakers
to follow. For instance, in debates there is usually a ‘moderator’ who ensures that
all the participants get a fair chance to speak. She might interrupt a speaker and
pass the turn on to another speaker. We could add a moderator entity to our
existing model of ME games. A passive moderator would have the responsibility
of the moderator is to assign turns to the players and could esure that no player
monopolized the conversation and that each player had a chance to respond to
an interlocutor’s assertion. We can also imagine active moderators and active
Juries that actually participate at least in some minimal way in the conversation.
We hope to tackle these issues in future research.
4 See [6] for a case where an unrestricted conversation might assign players victory
conditions with no pair of equilibrium strategies.
6 Appendix
6.1 The Cantor topology for finite and infinite strings
For any subset A of X, as usual, we denote by A∗ the set of finite strings over A
and by Aω, the set of countably infinite strings over A. Let ǫ ∈ A∗ be the empty
string and let A∞ = (A∗ ∪ Aω). We define a metric d on Xω as follows. Let
x = x0x1 . . . and y = y0y1 . . . be infinite sequences in X
ω where each xj , yj ∈ X,
j ≥ 1. Let n(x, y) be the first index where x and y differ. That is, xn(x,y) 6= yn(x,y)
and xj = yj for all 0 ≤ j < n(x, y). Then
d(x, y) =
1
2n(x,y)
d generates a (complete) metric space on Xω usually known as the Cantor topol-
ogy on Xω. We extend the metric d to X∞ by letting $ /∈ X be a new symbol,
identifying every x ∈ X+ with x$ω and extending the metric d to (Xω ∪X+$ω).
Under this metric, X+ gets the discrete topology (every subset is both open and
closed) and every open set in X∞ is of the form (A ∪BXω) where A,B ⊂ X+.
Moreover, (X∞, d) has the nice property of being the completion of the metric
space (X+, d) (see [15] for more details). Given any non-empty set X, we shall
work with Borel sigma algebras over X+, Xω and X∞ that are generated by the
topology defined above. Unless otherwise mentioned, a product of topological
spaces will be assigned the product topology. Given any set X we shall denote
its relative complement by X, when the universe is clear from the context.
6.2 Higher order beliefs
Definition 12 (Event). An event Eρi at ρ ∈ P for Player i or an i-event is a
measurable subset of (T(1−i)×S
ρ
(1−i)×TJ ). Similarly, an event E
ρ
J for the Jury
or a J -event is a measurable subset of (T0 × S
ρ
0 × T1 × S
ρ
1 ).
βρi (ti, h)(E
ρ
i ) is the subjective probability that Player i assigns to E
ρ
i given
history h ∈ h(ρ) and given that she is of type ti. Accordingly, ti is said to believe
Eρi at history h if β
ρ
i (ti, h)(E
ρ
i ) = 1. Furthermore, the subjective probability that
Player i assigns to Eρi given play ρ is denoted by β
ρ
i [ti](E
ρ
i ) and is defined as:
βρi [ti](E
ρ
i ) =
∫
h∈h(ρ)
ξi(ti, ρ)(h)β
ρ
i (ti, h)(E
ρ
i )dξi(ti, ρ)
ti is said to believe E
ρ
i at play ρ if β
ρ
i [ti](E
ρ
i ) = 1. The Bayesian conditional beliefs
are computed as usual. For example, given i-events Eρi and F
ρ
i at ρ, where F
ρ
i
is assumed to be non-null:
βρi (ti, h)(E
ρ
i |F
ρ
i ) =
βρi (ti, h)(E
ρ
i ∩ F
ρ
i )
βρi (ti, h)(F
ρ
i )
βρi [ti](E
ρ
i |F
ρ
i ) =
βρi [ti](E
ρ
i ∩ F
ρ
i )
βρi [t
ρ
i ](F
ρ
i )
Type ti of Player i believes E
ρ
i at ρ given F
ρ
i if β
ρ
i [ti](E
ρ
i |F
ρ
i ) = 1.
For an i-event Eρi at ρ, let
Bρi (E
ρ
i )
(1−i) = {(ti, σi, tJ ) ∈ (Ti × S
ρ
i × TJ ) | ti believes E
ρ
i }
Bρi (E
ρ
i )
J = {(t0, σ0, t1, σ1) ∈ (T0 × S
ρ
0 × T1 × S
ρ
1 ) | ti believes E
ρ
i }
Note that Bρi (E
ρ
i )
(1−i) is an (1− i)-event and Bρi (E
ρ
i )
J is a J -event. Then type
t(1−i) of Player (1−i) believes that Player i believes Ei at ρ if β
ρ
(1−i)[t(1−i)](B
ρ
i (E
ρ
i )
(1−i)) =
1 and type tJ of the Jury believes that Player i believes Ei at ρ if β
ρ
J [tJ ](B
ρ
i (E
ρ
i )
J ) =
1.
Similarly, for a J -event EρJ , let
BρJ (E
ρ
J )
i = {(t(1−i), σ(1−i), tJ ) ∈ (T(1−i) × S
ρ
(1−i) × TJ ) | tJ believes E
ρ
J }
That is, BρJ (E
ρ
J )
i is an i-event. Then type ti of Player i believes that the Jury
believes EρJ at ρ if β
ρ
i [ti](B
ρ
J (E
ρ
J )
i) = 1. These are the second-order beliefs of
the players and the Jury. Continuing this way, we can define any (finite) level of
higher-order belief of the players, the Jury, the higher order beliefs of the players
about the Jury and vice-versa etc.
6.3 Expected Utilities
We define expected utilities inductively.
Let ρ be a play and ti be a type of Player i. Define the following update
operation.
–
u0ti(hj) =
{
1 if h ∈ h(ρ) and hj /∈Win(1−i)
0 otherwise
where 0 ≤ j ≤ |ρ|.
– For every history h ∈ h(ρ) and for every prefix hj of h where 0 ≤ j < |ρ|
define the 1-turn extension of hj as
hj = {h
′ | |h′| = j + 1 and hj is a prefix of h
′}
Then uk+1ti (hj) for k ≥ 0 is given by:
∑
h′∈hj
∫
(T(1−i)×S
ρj+1
(1−i)
×TJ )
β
ρj+1
i (ti, h
′)(t(1−i), σ(1−i), tJ )ξ
ρj+1
i (ti, t(1−i), tJ )(h
′)ukti(h
′)d(ti, t(1−i), tJ )
The expected utility is then defined as the limit of the above operation as
k → ω for the history h0 and is denoted as uti(ρ).
Definition 13 (Expected utility). The expected utility for the type ti of Player
i for the play ρ is given by uti(ρ) = u
ω
ti
(h0).
Recall that although some plays are finite, they are in Win only if all their
continuations are. It is then straightforward to show that uωti(hj) exists and is
unique for all j ≥ 0 meaning that the expected utility is well-defined.
Lemma 1. Given a play ρ of the ME game, for every type ti of Player i, and
for every j ≥ 0, uωti(hj) exists and is unique.
Proof. Simply note that for every j ≥ 0, {ukti(hj)}k≥0 forms a non-increasing
Cauchy sequence.
6.4 Expected payoffs for strategies
Definition 14 (Expected payoff). Let G be an ME game and let p ∈ ∆(S(1−i))
be a probability measure over the set of strategies of (1− i). The expected payoff
of a strategy σi ∈ Si of type ti of Player i with respect to p is defined as the
Lebesgue integral:
uti(σi, p) =
∫
σ(1−i)∈S(1−i)
uti(ρ(σi,σ(1−i)))dp
σi maximizes expected payoff for type ti of Player i with respect to p provided for
all σ′i ∈ Si, uti(σi, p) ≥ uti(σ
′
i, p). Then, we also say that σi is a best response
to p for type ti.
Let T = ({Ti}, TJ , {βˆ
ρ
i }, {βˆ
ρ
J }, S) be a type space for an ME game G. Recall
that, given a play ρ, for every history h ∈ h(ρ), each type ti ∈ Ti is associated
with a probability measure βρi (ti, h) ∈ ∆(T(1−i) × S
ρ
(1−i) × TJ ). Then, for each
ti, define a probability measure p
ρ
ti
∈ ∆(S(1−i)) as: for every measurable subset
S′(1−i) of S(1−i) let
pρti(S
′
(1−i)) =
∑
h∈h(ρ)
∫
(T(1−i)×TJ )
ξρi (ti, t(1−i), tJ )(h)·β
ρ
i (ti, h)(t(1−i)×S
′
(1−i)×tJ )d(t(1−i), tJ )
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